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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the appellee-landowners herewith respectfully 
petition this Court to rehear and reconsider its Opinion 
issued in the case on November 20, 1990.x That Opinion 
reverses the interlocutory order of the District Court not on 
the merits of the adjudicated facts, but on the singular basis 
that the landowners, by withdrawing the monies deposited by 
the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") with the Court 
Clerk incident to its gaining immediate occupancy of the 
landowners' premises, had waived their right to urge a 
valuation date in the Just Compensation phase of the case 
different taan the statutorily presumed date of service of 
summons. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The effect of the Courtfs Opinion is manifold and 
profound. Without analysis, it reads into the Eminent Domain 
occupancy statite, Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9, an unsupported 
meaning of the phrase "abandonment of all defenses" never 
intended and one that is at material odds with the structural 
setting of condemnation Hdefenses" in the Eminent Domain Code. 
Further to that end, the Opinion makes the constitutionally 
ordained Just Compensation phase of the case potentially turn 
upon a narrow and rigid construction of the immediate occupan-
cy statute, contrary to the public policy of eminent domain 
and the holding of this Court in Utah State Road Comm. v. 
1
 Associate counsel for Appellees enters an appearance at this stage of the 
appeal because of potential implications in the Court Opinion on waiver. 
Frlberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984). As to the "waiver" of the 
right to urge a different and earlier valuation date, the 
Opinion is inconsistent with the elements of the waiver 
doctrine under the well established precedent of this Court. 
Lastly, the Court Opinion is unjust and harsh in its 
application and creates a substantial paradox for lawyers and 
their clients in eminent domain litigation. 
ISSUE OF LAW ON REHEARING 
Appellees are not insensitive to the fact that petitions 
for rehearing are not generally favored and should not be used 
to present either a new theory of the case or to simply 
reproduce an already thoroughly developed argument. The 
Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678, 681 (Utah 1982); 
Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 118 
Utah 37, 225 P.2d 754, 755 (1950). The fact is, however, that 
in this appeal, the question of whether the appellees' 
acceptance of immediate occupancy funds deposited by UDOT 
constituted a statutory waiver of the right to urge a differ-
ent valuation date in the Just Compensation phase of the case, 
was a relatively obscure issue until the Court Opinion. 
UDOT's argument was far from comprehensive on waiver, occupy-
ing barely 2 pages as Point IV of its opening brief. The 
appellees responded in scant fashion with less than 3 pages in 
Point IV of their answering brief. Thus, a thorough, analyti-
cal legal argument on waiver un ,er the immediate occupancy 
statute simply was not presented to the Court. 
2 
Yet the Court treated the waiver issue as the only 
question in the case, never reaching, much less mentioning, 
the extraordinary and penetrating factual analysis on the 
merits of the case which formed the basis of the District 
Court's holding. Accordingly, appellees respectfully submit 
that the Court erred by concluding in the Opinion that: 
We hold that appellees waived their right 
to challenge the dates of valuation when 
they withdrew the funds deposited by UDOT 
without taking some affirmative action to 
preserve their challenge. 
* * * 
Since the property owners in this in-
stance withdrew the funds without reserv-
ing any objection by stipulation or oth-
erwise, they waived the right to chal-
lenge the date of valuation. 
Slip Op. at 3, 5 (Attachment 1). 
The Slip Opinion is annexed hereto as Attachment 1. This 
Court, under the circumstances, should rehear and reconsider 
its decision, and conclude that by drawing down the immediate 
occupancy funds the appellees did not waive their right to 
urge a different valuation date in determining Just Compensa-
tion. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I . 
THE STRUCTURE AND POLICY OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN 
CODE AND OF SECTION 78-34-9, AS A PART THEREOF, 
MANIFESTS THAT THE "DEFENSES" SUBJECT TO WAIVER 
UPON WITHDRAWAL OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY FUNDS, 
RELATE ONLY TO ISSUES INVOLVING THE 
GOVERNMENT'S ENTITLEMENT TO CONDEMN. 
The District Court in this case, after a thorough 
evidentiary hearing, concluded that although UDOT brought 
3 
actions to condemn the appellees1 properties in August 1986 
and October 1987, by reason of UDOT's actions in 1977 and 
thereafter, the properties were frozen and sterilized in the 
market as of June 1977. The trial court further determined 
that a vacuous market for the properties existed thereafter 
within which UDOT ultimately filed its condemnation actions in 
1986 and 1987. The District Court found as ultimate fact and 
law that the evidence was sufficient under the teachings of 
this Court's opinion in Friberg, that in the Just Compensation 
phase of the case the valuation dates should be established as 
of June 22, 1977. 
This Court's Opinion has concluded that the singular and 
dispositive issue on appeal was not the rapacious conduct of 
UDOT in freezing and sterilizing the market of appellees' 
properties, but rather was the action of the landowners and 
their counsel in withdrawing the monies tendered by UDOT in 
consideration of obtaining physical possession, pendente lite, 
of the condemned properties. Focusing on the language of the 
immediate occupancy statute, Section 78-34-9, which provides 
that 
"[a] payment to a defendant as aforesaid 
shall be held to be an abandonment by 
such defendant of all defenses excepting 
his claim for greater compensation ...," 
the Court Opinion concludes, without rationale, that the 
valuation date for determining compensation was a "defense" to 
the action under the statute, and therefor, that the withdraw-
al of funds by appellees was an abandonment or waiver of the 
right to have damages in the Just Compensation phase assessed 
4 
as of the date in 1977 when UDOT's conduct froze the market 
for the lands ultimately condemned 9 to 10 years later. Slip 
Op. at 3. 
1. The Meaning of "Defenses" in Section 78-34-9. A 
reading of Section 78-34-9 in its setting and context as part 
of the Utah Eminent Domain Code is instructive, for the 
statute is housed in a Code section directly following the 
very specific "defenses" which are indigenous to a landowner's 
resistance to or denial of the condemnor's attempted condemna-
tion acquisition. In chromatic scale, those "defenses" are 
laid out in black letter language immediately preceding 
Section 78-34-9, e.g., failure of the condemnor to show that 
the proposed use is a public use and authorized by law2, or 
failure to show that public necessity exists for the proposed 
taking3, or failure to show that the construction of the 
proposed public work will not take place within a reasonable 
time4, or that the project is not located consistent with the 
greatest public good and the least private injury5, or that 
the condemnation complaint is otherwise infirm.6 Indeed, in 
the statutory context, the Just Compensation and damage 
elements of eminent domain are not even mentioned, much less 
addressed, until Section 78-34-10, et. seq. 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4(1). 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4(2). 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4(3). 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-5. 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-6. 
5 
Thus, it is that the only "defenses" to which Section 78-
34-9 refers, in the context of waiver, are those c anses 
which would prevent or deny a "taking" by the government. 
This statutory list of "defenses" does not include a challenge 
to the date of valuation and we submit there is no rational 
basis in law or in the eminent domain process for the judicia-
ry to create a "defense" out of a challenge to the date of 
valuation. 
The right to Just Compensation is a constitutional 
guarantee of Article I Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
It is of paramount importance that the eminent domain process 
be construed so as to insure that no landowner is deprived of 
Just Compensation. Provo City Corp. v. UDOT, 795 P.2d 1120 
(Utah 1990). The Court Opinion's catalogue of the valuation 
date issue as a "defense" under 78-34-9 places the constitu-
tional guarantee of Article I Section 22 in serious jeopardy. 
2. The Policy of Section 78-34-9. The policy behind 
the occupancy statute, Section 78-34-9, also demonstrates that 
the "defenses" that are waived by a withdrawal of the deposit-
ed monies refer only to those defenses which would deny the 
condemnation taking itself. This is not some sort of windfall 
or philanthropic statute that merely confers an economic 
benefit upon the landowner. Indeed, the primary thrust of 
Section 78-34-9 is for the condemning agency's benefit — it 
enables the government to force the landowner off and to 
obtain immediate physical possession of the condemned premises 
for the proposed public use upon motion within five days of 
6 
the filing and service of the condemnation complaint. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-34-9. In most instances, the motion is heard 
and granted far in advance of the filing of an answer by the 
landowner, much less framing the issues for trial, including 
the "defenses1* against or in denial of the "taking". 
The statutory policy of enabling the condemning agency to 
obtain quick but full occupancy of the premises at the 
inception of a condemnation case is an exceptional benefit and 
aid to the condemning agency and in the public interest of 
proceeding with the public project. The only quid pro quo of 
that benefit is the requirement that the government agency 
deposit with the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to 75% of 
the agency's preliminary estimate of the condemned property's 
value. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9. The statute, itself, is 
emphatic that the government's deposit or the landowner's 
withdrawal thereof shall not be in any way determinative of 
the compensation and damages to be ultimately paid in the Just 
Compensation phase of the case.7 Indeed, it is not admissible 
for any purpose as evidence in that phase. 
So far as the property owner is concerned, the public 
policy which Section 78-34-9 guards against is the possibility 
that the landowner might withdraw and utilize the immediate 
occupancy funds in one breath, and in the next argue that the 
government agency is not entitled to condemn the property 
7
 The fourth sentence of the Section reads: "The amount thus fixed shall 
be for the purposes of the motion only, and shall not be admissible in evidence on 
final hearing." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (emphasis added). The "final hearing" 
referred to is the Just Compensation phase. 
7 
because of the existence of one or more of the statutory 
HdefensesH enumerated in Sections 78-34-4, 5, and 6, Were the 
waiver provision not extant, intemperate action of the 
landowner potentially could make an hypocrisy of the eminent 
domain process• The policy of the waiver provision in Section 
78-34-9 insures that such an irony does not occur. 
Since the government's quick and physical possession 
under an occupancy order does not constitute a "taking" or a 
finding thereof in the constitutional sense8, and because the 
preliminary deposited funds incident to the quick occupancy is 
not binding against the government in the Just Compensation 
phase of the case, the government, as well as the landowner, 
is able to argue a valuation date other than the date of 
service of summons in the Just Compensation phase of the case. 
Both parties are entitled to discover and develop facts 
relating to the valuation date in the subsequent evidentiary 
damage phase. Friberg, 687 P.2d at 831, 832.9 
8
 The view has been expressed (and not without some polemic force) that 
an order of immediate occupancy should not be interlocutory in character and should 
resolve any "defenses11 to the condemnation taking. See Friberg, 687 P.2d at 840 
(Hall, CJ., in dissent.). The fact is, however, that the Utah Legislature has provided 
otherwise in the Eminent Domain Code and this Court has consistently held that a 
"defense" to the taking is subject to a bench trial subsequent to or independent of 
the prima facie case to be made out by the condemning agency in a Section 78-34-9 
motion for immediate occupancy. Friberg, supra, at 833; Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial 
Dist. Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739, 742 (1973); State Road Comm. v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co., 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P.2d 926, 927 (1958); State 
Road Comm. v. Danielson, 122 Utah 220, 247 P.2d 900, 901-02 (1952). 
9
 The orders of immediate occupancy entered herein did not purport to limit 
any issues as to Just Compensation, but provided that UDOT could "continue in 
possession * * pending further hearing and trial on issues that may be raised in this 
action.* *" (Emphasis added.) See Appellant's Br., Ex. R. 
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POINT II. 
IN UTAH STATE ROAD COMM. V. FRIBERG, THIS COURT 
TREATED THE ISSUE OF THE VALUATION DATE AS 
AN EVIDENTIARY QUESTION TO BE RAISED IN THE 
JUST COMPENSATION PHASE OF THE CASE. 
The Court Opinion notes at page 3 of the Slip Op., that 
this Court in Friberg declared that 78-34-11 establishes an 
evidentiary presumption of the date of service of summons as 
the value date for determining Just Compensation. To overcome 
the presumption, the evidence must not be "insignificant". 
Friberg, supra at 831. It may be overcome and rebutted by 
either the condemning agency or the landowner and the eviden-
tiary "burden of proof" is on the party urging a date other 
than that of service of summons. Friberg at 832. 
Clearly, Friberg did not treat the question of the date 
of valuation as a "defense" to the condemnation "taking". 
While the Court Opinion notes that the landowner in Friberg 
did not draw down on the condemnation deposit made by the 
State under 78-34-9, it is also to be noted that the State 
never took physical possession and occupancy of the Friberg 
property for 7 years, even though the order of occupancy was 
initially entered. 
1. The Date of Valuation is Not an Affirmative Defense. 
The Court Opinion states that in order for the landowner to 
preserve the right to challenge the date of valuation, some 
"affirmative action" must be taken. UDOT argues in its brief 
that, indeed, not only is affirmative action necessary, but 
that the appellee-landowners herein were required to pled the 
issue as an affirmative defense to the taking. That argument 
9 
1; misconceived. An affirmative defense is one that, if 
successful, results in the dismissal of the condemning 
agency's complaint and as such, it is required to be plead 
specifically under Rule 8(c) U.R.Civ.P. Yet if the date of 
valuation issue is, in law, one of the "affirmative defenses" 
to a "taking" under 78-34-9, it must be pled in response to a 
motion for immediate occupancy even though no pleading by way 
of an answer is yet due. 
This sort of procedural quagmire merely adds force to the 
argument that the issue of the valuation date is an evidentia-
ry question which is ripe for adjudication in the Just 
Compensation phase of the case by either party under a motion 
in limine or at pretrial hearing. It was thus regarded in 
Friberg. 
POINT III. 
IN CONCLUDING THAT WITHDRAWAL OF THE 
OCCUPANCY DEPOSIT BY THE APPELLEES WAS 
A WAIVER, THE COURT OPINION APPEARS TO 
DEPART FROM ESTABLISHED WAIVER PRECEDENT. 
In American Savings and Loan Assoc, v. Blomquist, 21 U.2d 
289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968) this Court quoted with approval from an 
earlier decision in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 
187, 194, 61 P.2d 308 (1936), as to the elements of waiver: 
"* * A waiver is the intentional relin-
quishment of a known right. To consti-
tute a waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge 
of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it. It must be distinctly 
made, although it may be express or im-
plied. H 
10 
American Savings has been cited with approval recently in 
Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1988) wherein Judge 
Billings writing for the Court of Appeals held: 
"* * The parties actions or conduct must 
evince unequivocally an intent to waive, 
or must be inconsistent with any other 
intent, [citing American Savings] Wheth-
er a right has been waived is generally a 
question of fact and therefore we accord 
considerable deference to the finder of 
factf s determination." 
750 P.2d at 1230. 
There is no evidence in the record of this case that the 
appellee-landowners "knowinglyH and "intentionally relin-
quished" or unequivocally waived the right to argue a differ-
ent valuation date. Prior to the Court Opinion herein, there 
was no case law or statute in this jurisdiction or otherwise 
which even came close to suggesting that a drawdown by the 
landowner of an immediate occupancy deposit of a condemnor 
would, ipso facto, axiomatically result in the waiver of the 
right to raise the valuation question in determining Just 
Compensation. No case law suggested that 78-34-9 would be so 
construed. Where a constitutional right is at stake, a waiver 
should not be presumed. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 
1980). 
The Court Opinion finding such is at variance with the 
waiver precedent of this Court. 
POINT IV. 
IF ALLOWED TO STAND, THE COURT OPINION 
CREATES A HARSH AND UNJUST PARADOX FOR 
A PROPERTY OWNER AND LAWYERS. 
11 
The Court Opinion suggests several ways that a property 
owner could preserve the right to raise the date of valuation 
in determining Just Compensation, viz., . . (i) the landowner 
could choose not to withdraw the immediate occupancy funds 
tendered by the condemnor, (ii) obtain a stipulation from the 
condemnor or (iii) obtain a court order preserving an objec-
tion to the date of valuation. 
Candidly, the suggested proposals are unworkable. As to 
(i), the monies are a trade-off for the immediate loss of 
possession of the property (often income producing and subject 
to debt payments). In all probability, the landowner may have 
retained legal counsel only a matter of days before or after 
the occupancy order and deposit. None of the evidence has 
been assembled or developed on market value or the appropriate 
value date. What element of justice is served by requiring 
the landowner to forego the withdrawal of immediate occupancy 
funds, which if not taken down, will not earn any interest or 
return? Does the Court Opinion intend that the landowner be 
forced to gamble at the very inception of the case on an issue 
that is, to tell the truth, inextricably involved only in the 
Just Compensation determination? 
As to Court Opinion alternatives (ii) and (iii), UDOT or 
any other condemnor has little incentive and is unlikely to 
stipulate to preserving a right in a landowner, that this 
Court has declared a "defense" under 78-34-9, or that may 
substantially impact Just Compensation. The trial court could 
discretionarily deny a request particularly in light of the 
12 
Court Opinion. When all is said, the fact is that under the 
Court Opinion, in order for the landowner to "reasonably" 
preserve this very simple but critical right the immediate 
occupancy funds cannot be touched. The condemnor thus would 
get immediate possession and the landowner, who has no 
intention whatsoever of raising a "defense" against the 
"taking" is deprived of that money which the Legislature has 
plainly said should be paid. Such is a harsh and unjust 
result. 
And what of the landowner's lawyer? Counsel is, upon 
retainment, immediately confronted with the disagreeable 
paradox of attempting to preserve a right to urge a different 
valuation date without any basis of then known and supported 
facts (a potential violation of Rule 11, see Hudson v. Moore 
Business Forms, Inc., 827 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1987)), or risk 
recommending to the client that the funds be left on deposit 
as a result of the Court Opinion herein. The latter choice 
may subject the lawyer to claims by the client for having 
failed to immediately analyze the valuation date question. 
Moreover, it may prove a trap for the lawyer who reads 78-34-9 
without also simultaneously scanning the Court Opinion. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The structural flow of the Eminent Domain Code evidences 
the legislative intent that the "defenses" under 78-34-9 which 
are waived and abandoned by a landowner withdrawing an 
immediate occupancy deposit are those which deny, oppose, or 
obstruct the attempted "taking" by the condemning agency. Any 
13 
argument on the date of valuation is inexorably tied to the 
Just Compensation phase and does not impact upon or deny the 
"taking". Under the precedent of Friberg/ the date of taking 
is like many other issues in the damage phase of the trial, 
viz., an evidentiary question of which the burden of proof 
rests with the party (condemnor or landowner) urging other 
than the presumptive date of service of summons. 
This Court should grant a rehearing in this case, and on 
reconsideration, the November 20, 1990 Opinion should be set 
aside with the District Court's determination on the date of 
valuation affirmed, it is 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL7 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 537-5555 
(Associated on Rehearing) 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
TEX R. OLSEN 
225 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
(801) 896-4461 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
Dated: January 7, 1991 
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of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of 
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and Sevier County Treasurer, 
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IAysuLSoxmuab~& partnership, 
Christie Richards, Janice 
Parker, Leane Jarrette, and 
Jean Young, 
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Utah Department of Transportation, 
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J.D. Springer, 
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Sixth District, Sevier County 
The Honorable Don V, Tibbs 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam, Donald S. Coleman, Stephen C. 
Ward, Alan S, Bachman, Salt Lake City, Cor 
Utah Department of Transportation 
Kay L. Mclff, Ken Chamberlain* Tex R. Olsen, 
Richfield, for Walter M. Ogden and Sons, Inc., 
Rulon Lind and Flora S. Lind, Laygo Company, and 
j.D. Springer 
DIIRHAM. Juatice: 
The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) brings 
this interlocutory appeal from an order of the trial court 
in condemnation proceedings where appellees* properties were 
condemned for highway construction. The trial court changed 
the statutory date of valuation of the properly and the date 
from which interest should accrue on that value* We reverse. 
Appellees each owned property on the west side of 
Richfield that UDOT needed to construct Interstate Highway 
70, UDOT followed the proper procedures in condemning tho 
properties by serving each appellee with a summons, 
tendering into court approved appraisals for each piece of 
property/ and securing uncontested orders of occupancy. All 
of these actions occurred between August 1986 and October 
3 987. The landowners were served with process on August 19, 
1986, and October 7, 12, and 15, 1987.l Each of the 
landowners withdrew the tendered amount of money without 
raising any objections to the taking, or reserving any 
issues related to the taking, including the date of 
valuation. 
Under Utah law, the date of valuation is presumed 
to be the date of service of summons. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-11* Interest is computed on a compensation award 
•from the date of taking actual possession . . . or the 
order of occupancy, whichever is earlier." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-9* After withdrawing the appraisal funds, each 
landowner filed a motion to have the trial court fix dates 
different from those specified under the statute for the 
date of valuation and the date from which interest should 
accrue. Appellees claimed that valuation at the time the 
summonses were served did not lead to -just compensation" 
under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution* 
Although the cases have not been consolidated for trial, 
they were consolidated for a hearing on appellees9 motions. 
After a hearing on the motions/ the trial judge ordered that 
each of the dates of valuation for the properties should be 
changed from the various 1986-87 dates (the dates summonses 
were served) to June 22, 1977.2 UDOT appeals from this 
order. 
1. These dates are presumed to be the dates of valuation. As 
discussed in more detail below, Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11 
provides that the date of service of process "shall be deemed" 
to be the date of valuation. 
2. The majority of the parties' briefs discuss which of these 
dates was the oer one for valuation. Because we decide 
this case on a ooedural point, we do not address these 
arguments* 
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unOT argues that appellees waived their right to 
challenge the valuation dates. As noted above, UDOT 
tendered to the court the full amounts of its approved 
appraisals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 *s a 
condition precedent to occupying the properties. These 
amounts were withdrawn by each appellee, UDOT claim* that 
by withdrawing these funds, appellees abandoned their right 
to challenge the valuation dates. We agree. Section 
78-34-9 provides in part: 
Upon the application of the parties in 
interest, the court shall order the money 
deposited in the court be paid forthwith 
for or on account of the just compensation 
to be awarded in the proceeding. A 
payment to a defendant as aforesaid shall 
be held to be an abandonment by such 
defendant of all defenses excepting his 
claim for greater compensation. 
The statute expresses the long-recognized common law concept 
that a landowner who accepts compensation awarded for lands 
taken for public use waives all other remedies* except a 
claim for greater compensation or damages* United states v. 
Lynfth, 188 U.S. 445, 462 (1903); Winslow v. Baltimore £. Ohio 
R.R,, 208 U.S. 59, 63 (1906); Conawav v. Yolo Water L Power 
&L,, 204 Cal. 125, 266 P. 944, 946-47 (1928); 27 Am. Jur. 2d 
Eminent Pom In § 494 (1966). 
This court specifically recognised this concept and 
its embodiment in section 78-34-9 in Redevelopment Agency ** 
Salt Lake Clfcv v. Tanner. 740 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1987): "[The] 
language (of section 78-34-9J correctly states the 
established and applicable rule that once a property owner 
chooses to withdraw the money deposited by the State in 
obtaining the order [of immediate occupancy], he waives all 
objections and defenses to the action. , . . except any 
claim to greater compensation." JUL. at 1300 (emphasis 
added); flee alSQ Utah State Ed. Comm'n v. rrlhrg. 687 P. 2d 
821, 833 n.10 (Utah 1984). Me hold that appellees waived 
their right to challenge the dates of valuation when they 
withdrew the funds depoeited by UDOT without taking some 
affirmative action to preserve their challenge. 
In C£ll2t£g# this court, in a plurality opinion, 
held that section 78-34-11 of the Utah Code "creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the date for determining 
valuation shall be the date of service of process." 687 
P.2d at 831. The court established a high standard for 
rebutting the presumption and explained the policy reasons 
for doing so: 
Neither the constitutional right of the 
landowner or the right of the State to 
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fairness would find root in firmer ground 
if the statutory language were construed 
so loosely as to permit the service of 
summon5 to be regularly challenged on the 
basis of appraisals that, at moat, might 
result in minor differences in the 
valuation. On the contrary, the 
constitutional right and the interests it 
protects, both directly and indirectly, 
are accorded greater protection by a 
gubatanMflfr <*«9^ee of certainty, which 
will reduce the gggt p* ljfci?»fcion and 
promote the expeditions disposition of 
condemnstIon suite, thereby allowing the 
condemnee to adjust with as little 
disruption as possible to the impact of 
the condemnation. 
IdL st 831*32 (emphasis added). 
Those same policy considerations support our 
holding in this case* The legislature has mandated 
procedures for exercising the powers of eminent domain. 
These procedures are meant to provide the •substantial 
degree of certainty* discussed in Friberg. Among these are 
the steps outlined in section 78*34-9/ i.e., serving 
summons, depositing funds, and securing an order of 
immediate occupancy. Once the condemnor has followed these 
steps and the property owner has withdrawn the funds 
tendered to the court, the condemnor may assume that tho 
property owner has assented to the fundamental legitimacy of 
the taking. The property owner may still dispute the amount 
of compensation after withdrawing the appraisal funds, but 
he is estopped from disputing any other aspect of the 
taking. One such aspect is the date BB of which the 
property must be valued for compensation purposes. 
Appellees have argued that the date of valuation is 
exclusively related to the question of compensation and may 
therefore be disputed after withdrawal of the appraisal 
funds. He do not agree. Although the date of valuation 
affects the amount of compensation, it is more closely 
related conceptually to the defenses mentioned in section 
78-34-9. Therefore, after the property owner has withdrawn 
the funds, the condemnor is entitled to a degree of 
certeinty regarding the taking, including the date upon 
which compensation must be assessed. This is the policy 
behind section 78-34-11, which deems the date of valuation 
to be the date of service of summons, we adhered to that 
poller of providing certainty in eminent domain proceedings 
when we construed section 78-34*11 in ElihULSL- In £jdUbft£a, 
the property owners withdrew the deposited funds pursuant to 
a stipulation which explicitly reserved for trial the issue 
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of the date of valuation- Our holding in this case—that a 
property owner's objection to the presumption that the date 
of service of summons is the proper date of valuation must 
be raised before withdrawal of appraisal funds—further 
promotes certainty and efficiency in eminent domain 
proceedings. 
This does not mean that a property owner, if faced 
with a situation where the date of service of process would 
be an unfair valuation date, is unable to dispute the date. 
In fact, there are a number of possible ways to object to 
the presumption that the date of service of process is the 
proper date of valuation. A property owner could choose not 
to withdraw the funds tendered by the condemnor. This would 
clearly preserve an objection to the date of valuation- A 
property owner might accept the appraisal funds under 
stipulation that he or she is preserving an objection to the 
date of valuation, as was done by the appellants in 
Friberg. 687 p.2d at 827. Absent a stipulation, a property 
owner could seek approval from the court for withdrawal of 
the appraisal funds after giving notice of the objection to 
the date* That approval should be granted by the trial 
court upon a prima facie showing that applying the 
presumption of valuation as of the date of service of 
summons may be unconstitutional, fiftfi Frlbero, 687 P.2d at 
830-31. Since the property owners in this instance withdrew 
the funds without reserving any objection by stipulation or 
otherwise, they waived the right to challenge the date of 
valuation. 
The trial court ruled that interest should be 
computed from the June 1977 date rather than the date the 
immediate order of occupancy was granted. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-9. The basis for this ruling was the court's 
resolution of the valuation date claim, which claim we now 
hold waived by the appellees. We therefore also reverse 
this part of the trial court's order. 
Because we reverse the trial court's order on 
procedural grounds, we do not address the other arguments 
raised. 
WE CONCUR; 
Gordon R* Hall, Chief Justice Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
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